TEORIA DO FEIXE E TEORIA DO SUBSTRATO

uma análise acerca do problema da individuação e da co-instanciação entre propriedades como fundamentação metafísica do objeto singular

Abstract

The bundle theory posits that individuals are constituted by sets of properties. A set of properties w, composed of members F, G, and H, constitutes what we call a bundle. The notion of the individual developed throughout the 17th century understands the particular as a fundamental ontological category. More precisely, it is in Locke that this notion is formalized as a substratum theory. Locke asserts that sensible qualities do not exist without the individual and, therefore, the individual holds ontological priority. Since these qualities cannot occur independently, Locke assigns the concept of substratum to the constitution of the primordial individual—that which serves as the support (or hanger) for the properties united in the singular object. My main objective in this paper is to develop Russell’s (1872–1970) theory of compresence, starting from an atomic analysis of properties. First, I will present how Hume (1711–1776) objects to Lockean individuation through a proto-bundle theory. Then, I briefly discuss three versions of the bundle theory proposed by Van Cleve (1984). Following this, I defend Russell’s theory of compresence as a plausible account of the bundle, addressing three major objections raised by Van Cleve alongside Casullo’s (1987) notion of bundles of bundles. Accordingly, I present two challenges to the Black’s spheres problem: the first offers a solution to individuation through the conception of immanent universals; the second revolves around an objection I term the act/object verifiability objection.