COROLÁRIOS DO MÉTODO FENOMENOLÓGICO DE HUSSERL

Abstract

This article aims to re-read the structure of the phenomenological method proposed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The author aimed to understand the dynamics that involve the relationship between consciousness and fact in the process of knowledge production. Its phenomenology aims to describe the field of our experience without consciousness deviating from or providing resistance to the object studied. The method begins with the epoché, a phenomenological reduction, a suspension of all knowledge based on empirics – this is not a denial of scientific knowledge, but a provisional disregard of the description of reality according to the discourse of philosophy, of positive science and even religion. From this rigorous method, we reach the apprehension of consciousness, which allows us to understand how particular facts can be apprehended in a way that characterizes universal knowledge. If we want to appropriate Husserlian Phenomenology, we must observe the motivations that delimited it as a philosophical activity and that imposed its particular form on this activity.