OS EXPERIMENTOS DE PENSAMENTO COMO RECURSO METODOLÓGICO PARA UMA ONTOLOGIA E UMA EPISTEMOLOGIA

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to examine thought experiments as an ontological and/or epistemic methodology. Considering the taxonomy carried out by Rorbert Brown, we believe it is possible to outline the importance of this type of experiment. This classification describes two general types of thought experiments, namely: constructive; and destructive. The first refers to an attempt to promote a refutation of a theory. The second aims to corroborate a thesis, facilitating its understanding. However, the criticisms made against this taxonomy will be noted. By establishing an understanding of the general characteristics of thought experiments, we will verify their applicability carried out by two great names in the approach to the mind: initially, we will examine the Chinese room argument built by John Searle; Next, we will address the zombie world thesis put forward by David Chalmers. We will also examine the apologia set up by Daniel Dennett that describes thought experiments as intuition bombs. Apparently, thought experiments play a fundamental role in the production of knowledge.